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PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN GUINEA, DOES MACRO-INSTABILITY MATTER?  
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Issa SANOGO* and Zakaria GYENGANI**1 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines empirically the link between macro-instability and private investment rate in Guinea, 
in comparison with WAEMU countries2. Notwithstanding the caution imposed by data and 
methodological limitations in interpreting the results, the paper shows that macroeconomic instability is, in 
general, higher in Guinea than WAEMU countries. Consequently, macroeconomic uncertainties are cause 
of concern. Using a panel data approach, the findings suggest that the negative effects of relative price 
volatility (mainly inflation, real effective exchange rates) expected in theory, do not occur when small 
deviations are combined with competitiveness, resulting from a declining real effective exchange rate. In 
addition, the positive effect of foreign exchange reserves on the private investment rate supports the view 
that the availability of foreign exchange reserves is critical in a fixed exchange rate regime as that of 
WAEMU, as well as in an imperfect floating exchange rate regime as that of Guinea.   
While the panel data approach shows no evidence of negative impact of macroeconomic uncertainties, it 
suggests further analysis to explore the robustness of this result. A time series approach is carried out for 
Guinea, with regard to this purpose. As mentioned above, Guinea registers higher level of macroeconomic 
instability, compared to WAEMU countries. Using a single error correction model, the counter-intuitive 
impact of macroeconomic instability variables (measured by the real effective exchange rate, inflation rate 
and the terms of trade) persists. Given the dominant share of the mining sector in the private investment 
figures, the findings may be misleading as this sector may be protected from the wrong market signals 
resulting from the increasing macro-instability. However, capturing such an ‘enclave-effect’ is 
unfortunately limited by the lack of disaggregated investment data by sector. 
Finally, the results indicate a negative (indirect) impact of macroeconomic instability (measured by the real 
lending rate and the flow of credit to the economy) on the private sector investment. They suggest 
additional efforts to improve the overall macroeconomic context and especially, an in-depth openness of 
the financial sector, to diversify credit instruments to the private sector in Guinea.    
                                                 
1 The preliminary draft of this paper was issued in 2005 when the former author was an associate lecturer at the 
Social Research Centre of Côte d’Ivoire (CIRES/GPE) and economist at the World Bank Country Office in 
Guinea/Conakry and the latter one was a postgraduate student at CIRES/GPE. We are grateful to Dennis Jones 
(IMF) and Boubacar-Sid Barry (World Bank) and the postgraduate students of CIRES/GPE for their insightful 
comments. Many thanks to Faye Harbottle for her highly appreciated editorial assistance. The views expressed in this 
article do not reflect those of any organization. The authors are solely responsible for any remaining errors. 
2 West African Economic and Monetary Union. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A Brief Overview of Policies and Macro-economic Performance in Guinea 
Guinea voted against Charles de Gaulle’s proposed French community in 1958 and then declared 
independence. As a result, it was shunned by France and other western nations. In this relative 
isolation, Guinea developed a strong national identity ruled by a dictatorial power, a centralized 
economic policy and lack of private initiatives. Since the end of this first political regime in 1984, 
a process of economic liberalization has been underway in Guinea1. The policy measures 
embedded in the first economic reform program of 1986 focused on private sector promotion 
for the purpose of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). In this context, the first investment 
code of 1984 was reviewed, successively, in 1987, 1991, 1995 and 1997.   
However, overall performance (and in particular the private sector) remained mixed in a changing 
macro-economic environment. Although GDP growth reached 4 percent (annual average) over 
the 1986-2002 period, the gross national income per capita declined by 0.5 percent per year, 
compared to a 0.4 percent annual average increase in the WAEMU. Performance in the fiscal 
sector was mixed. From 1986 to 1992, fiscal deficit (including current grants) varied between 
4.4 percent and 8.7 percent of current GDP, while it declined over the 1992-2000 period and 
increased from 4.4 percent in 2001 to 5.9 percent in 2003. In contrast with many WAEMU 
countries that delegated their monetary policy to the regional central bank (BCEAO), the 
government of Guinea implemented macroeconomic policies by adapting the monetary policy of 
the national central bank (BCRG) to the fiscal policy. As a result, the 20 percent ceiling (set as a 
percentage of the previous year’s tax revenues) of BCRG’s credit to the government was rarely 
met. BCRG’s credit to the government reached 61.8 percent in 2002, up from 15.7 percent in 
1998. Over the 1987-2002 period, the monetary financing of the budget deficit led to a two-digit 
inflation rate : 25.5 percent on average over 1987-1992, less than 5 percent over 1993-2002 and 
about 13 percent in 2003, while the end of year 2004 annual average is estimated at about 
17.5 percent. 
In the external sector, the current account balance has been negative since 1986. The deficit 
(excluding grants) reached 9.3 percent, 7.3 percent, 7.8 percent and 5.9 percent of GDP in 1986, 
1993, 2002 and 2003, respectively. The decline of the external deficit in 2003 is due to a 
slowdown in imports of equipment, resulting from about a 22 percent decline of investment 
volumes. This deficit was financed by the accumulation of new arrears and the use of foreign 
                                                 
1 The first economic and financial reform program, launched in 1986, focused on privatization of economic sectors.   
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reserves, which subsequently dropped to only 1.5 months of imports.  Since 1986, Guinea has 
attempted to open up its markets to internal and external trade. In 2001, international trade 
openness (measured by the ratio of trade volume to GDP) was estimated at 24 percent of GDP 
(as compared with its neighbors, e.g., 60.5 percent of GDP in Côte d’Ivoire and only 15-18 
 percent in Senegal)1.  This openness was concentrated in the mining sector (more than 
80 percent of export value of goods).  On imports, the openness was dominantly driven by final 
consumption of goods and services 2.   
As for the private sector, expectations of continuing high investment levels turned out to be 
disappointing over the 1986-2002 period3.  In 1986 the private investment volume (1994 constant 
prices) stood at 15.3 percent of GDP, then declined year by year, from 12.9 percent in 1987 to 
11.1 percent of GDP in 1994. Successive investment code revisions in 1987, 1991, 1995 and 1997 
failed to circumvent this declining trend, due to weak implementation. The private investment 
rate reached only 9.5 percent, 8.9 percent and 6.1 percent in 2001, 2002 and 2003, respectively, 
while FDI remained below 1 percent of GDP over the whole period, with a decline of inflows 
since 1999.   
The long-term economic underperformance has been a major impediment for growth and 
economic and social development prospects. This paper analyzes the potential role of macro-
economic instability on private investment performance in Guinea, in comparison to WAEMU 
countries. This comparison is important with regard to convergence issues that Guinea is 
expected to fulfill as part of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) which is expected to 
converge toward the WAEMU zone4. It is expected that this study would fill the lack of a specific 
study on the relationship between volatile macro-economic indicators and the private investment 
rate in Guinea. Although policy difference (different monetary, fiscal and exchange policies, 
major devaluation in WAEMU in 1994, etc.) and data limitations suggest caution in interpreting 
results, recent developments support this research.   
                                                 
1 IMF’s trade restrictiveness index is repeatedly rated at 3 on a 10-points scale (with 1 indicating complete openness 
and 10 indicating complete restrictiveness).  The un-weighted average tariff rate is 16.4 percent (World Bank/CPIA, 
2003). 
2 Imports of food products increased from $USD8 million (constant price of 1987) in 1986 to $USD68,3 million in 
2000, or an equivalent of $USD1,2 per capita to $USD8,4 per capita.  Rice import amounted $USD54,5 million 
(constant price of 1987) in 2000, while there were no rice import in 1986.   
3 A review of the investment office (OPIP, 2001) showed that the number of settlement demands and investment 
projects (both in projection and realization) declined year after year. 
4 The WAMZ, that is expected to converge towards the WAEMU zone, comprises Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cape Verde. The macroeconomic conditions of the creation of a single 
currency in West Africa are the following: inflation should be less than 5 percent; budget deficit, commitment 
basis (before grants) should be less than 5 percent of GDP; Central Bank financing of the budget deficit should 
be less than 10 percent of the previous year’s fiscal revenue and gross external reserves should cover at least 3 
months of imports. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will compare Guinea’s macro-
economic performance with WAEMU countries in relation to private investment -the WAEMU 
zone is assumed to be a stable economic zone compared to Guinea1. Finally, Section 3 will 
estimate both a panel data model and an error correction model of the flexible accelerator to 
identify relevant macro-economic determinants for Guinea.   
II.  PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND MACRO-ECONOMIC INSTABILITY 
An Outlook 
Conceptually, macroeconomic instability refers to phenomena that decrease the predictability of 
the domestic macroeconomic environment, leading to resource-allocation distortion and 
hampering investment and growth (Montiel and Serven, 2004). The empirical evidence suggests 
that a competitive and stable macroeconomic environment characterized by low and stable 
internal and external deficits, low inflation and real depreciation of the exchange rate is conducive 
to higher growth led by significant private investment (Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991). This 
section examines the volatility of key macroeconomic outcome variables such as the rate of 
growth of real output and the rate of inflation, the changes in the macroeconomic policy 
environment (i.e. fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies) captured by the real effective 
exchange rate and the real interest rate, as well as the changes of exogenous shocks such as the 
terms of trade, by comparing Guinea with WAEMU countries.  
2.1  Growth and Investment Performance 
Over the last two decades, Guinea recorded, on average, an annual growth rate of GDP above 
the average of WAEMU countries (3.9 percent against 2.8 percent).  However, comparing 
investment figures among developing countries can be misleading (Box 1), due to a lack of 
accurate data on investment trends. The estimates generally rest on different assumptions and 
different data sources, limiting comparison between countries and suggesting prudent 
interpretation of performance.   
 
Box 1: Measurement Problems of Private Investment in Guinea 
In many developing countries, the methodologies to measure the private investment rates are limited by past trend 
dynamics and errors on the major components of the private sector. In general, the private investment rate is 
estimated on the basis of the performance of its main components such as private formal enterprises, households 
and a residual including informal sector.  In Guinea, the estimate of private investment takes account of three major 
components : mining companies, other enterprises (including public enterprises) and households. The mining 
sector’s investment corresponds to their value-added, weighted by an average of past investment rates.  Since 2002 
this estimate is augmented by foreign direct investment (FDI).  This approach assumes a stable trend of investment 
rate while the inclusion of FDI admits that all FDI takes place in the mining sector, with a risk of over-estimating.  
The level of investment of other enterprises corresponds to the value-added in the secondary sector (except mining 
                                                 
1 The convergence pact of stability and economic growth signed by WEAMU countries in 1994, rests on fiscal 
discipline, monetary and price stability.  Central bank (BCEAO) budget deficit financing was limited to 20 percent of 
previous year tax revenues.  Since January 2003, monetary financing of budget deficit is forbidden. 
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companies), augmented by value-added of trade and transport, weighted by a given investment rate.  Public 
enterprises are included in other enterprises, assuming that they have autonomy in terms of investment.  However 
government ownership of the capital can lead to some interference in investment decision making, though the 
privatization of the core enterprises reduces somehow this constraint.  In addition, including trade and transport 
corresponds to an effort to measure the informal sector’s investment by its major contributors and is therefore 
under-estimating the reality of this elusive sector.  Overall, the weighted value-added, as an estimate of the 
investment level does not take fully into account, organizational, restructuring and operational strategies that may 
result in an increase of value-added without any additional investment.  Finally, households investment corresponds 
to a share of gross domestic product (GDP) and behaves therefore as a residual on the demand side.   In general, 
methodologies differ between countries so that comparisons should be interpreted cautiously. 
Although Guinea’s private investment performance is driven by private capital formation, 
economic growth is not followed by an increase of gross national income (GNI) per capita.  The 
GNI per capita declined by 0.5 percent a year, while it increased by 0.4 percent (on average) in 
WAEMU countries over the 1987-2002 period (Table 1).  Only Niger and Côte d’Ivoire 
experienced a decline of this indicator over the period.  Guinea’s weak performance could be detrimental 
to investment, given the fact that, in theory, an increase of GNI per capita releases additional resource to augment 
salaries and profits of economic agents.  The demand effect of this distribution process leads to an 
increase of demand for goods and services.  As a result, new investment decisions can be made to 
meet demand, provided that production capacities are over-run.   
 
Table 1.  Some Basic Macro-economic Indicators 
 
Until  2001, Guinea’s private investment rate (as a  percent of GDP) was among the highest in 
the sub-region, in comparison with WAEMU countries.  It reached almost 12 percent of GDP 
on average over the 1997-2001 period, while the WAEMU zone was characterized by weak and 
unstable rates, except in Togo which performed better than Guinea.   
Since then, Guinea’s private investment rate declined sharply from 9.5 percent of GDP to 
8.9 percent in 2002 and 6.1 percent in 2003.  The plunging investment rate in 2003 is due to a 
35 percent decline of private investment values (4.3 percent in terms of volume).  The same trend 
is observed in WAEMU countries, except in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau, but on a 
smaller scale.   
GNI per capita (i) GNI per capita GDP (ii) GFCF (iii) Private Investment
(USD) (% growth) (% growth) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
Benin 348.8 1.8 3.9 15.0 7.9
Burkina Faso 263.5 0.7 3.5 19.5 11.1
Côte d'Ivoire 711.8 -0.8 1.6 10.9 6.9
Guinea Bissau 192.9 0.3 1.9 25.1 7.3
Mali 242.4 1.8 4.0 21.1 12.2
Niger 226.5 -1.8 2.2 9.6 3.6
Senegal 562.9 0.9 3.0 14.5 9.4
Togo 336.5 0.3 1.8 15.8 11.9
Guinea 494.7 -0.5 3.9 17.3 10.7
Average WAEMU (iv) 495.8 0.4 2.8 14.2 8.4
Source: World Bank/African Development Indicators and Live Database, 2003, Author's Estimates.
(i) : Gross National Income (GNI), Atlas Method (ii) : Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
(iii) : Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) (iv) : WAEMU: West African Economic Monetary Union
Average 1987-2002
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Over the 1986-2002 period, foreign direct investment (FDI) represented only 0.5 percent of 
GDP, on annual average in Guinea, while the weighted average of WAEMU zone was at least 
twice higher (1.2 percent of GDP), with higher rates in Benin (1.9 percent), Togo (1.6 percent),  
Mali (1.3 percent) and Côte d’Ivoire (1.3 percent). The net flows of FDI in Guinea became 
negative in 2000 and 2001 (respectively, US$–47.2 and US$-58 million) and nil in 2002 and 2003, 
because of a wait-and-see behaviour adopted by foreign investors with regard to the decline of  
the terms of trade in mining sector, the conflicting relationship between the government and 
mining companies and the worsening macro-economic performance. 
Figure 1.  Trends of Foreign Direct Investment (as a percentage of GDP), 1986-2002 
Source: Author’s Estimates 
The correlation between the public and private investment rates is ambiguous, according to the 
figures below, although the trend is clearly negative for Guinea.  In theory, an increase of public 
demand, notably public investments, is an important sign for private investment decision making.  
Indeed, public investments that support production are positively correlated to private 
investment1.  The magnitude of the correlation is higher in the absence of distortionary taxes 
(Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou, 1995) and congestion effects of infrastructure. By contrast, public 
expenditures oriented to current consumption crowd out private investment.   
Figure 2 shows a different relationship between private investment and public investment in each 
country. Trends of both private and public investment rates declined in Guinea from 1987 to 
2002, in contrast with Senegal. However,  they diverged in Benin, from 1997 to 2002, with an 
upward trend of private investment over the whole period. Up to 1996, the Benin public 
investment rate was as high as its private investment rate, in contrast with other countries where 
the private investment rate remained higher than the public investment rate during this period.  
Togo is characterized by a declining trend from 1987 to 1994 and an increasing trend over the 
1994-2002 period.   
Overall, the comparison carried out above over the 1987-2002 period shows that Togo and Mali 
performed better in terms of private investment rate, despite their weak economic growth 
                                                 
1 Many authors contributed to this debate during the 90’s (see the forthcoming paper of Bogetic Z. and I. Sanogo, 
2005, for a review of the literature). 
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performance.  By contrast, Senegal and Benin recorded higher economic growth rates with 
moderate and low private investment performance respectively. Guinea is a middle performer 
among these countries, with private investment and economic growth rates close to the sub-
regional averages, though slightly above.  Consequently, the remainder of the paper may 
demonstrate better understanding of contrasting private investment performance, comparing 
Guinea with less and best performers, respectively Benin (private investment rate below the 
average of WAEMU) and Senegal and Togo (private investment rates above the average of 
WAEMU). 
 
Figure 2.  Private, Public Investment and GDP Growth Rates ( percent), 1987-2002 
Source: Author’s Estimates 
2.2 Macro-Economic Instability in Prospect 
The volatility of macro-economic indicators (real effective exchange rate -REER, terms of trade 
and inflation rate) does not show any big difference between Guinea and WAEMU countries 
over the 1987-2002 period, while the 1987-1994 and 1994-2002 sub-periods reveal higher 
volatility in Guinea.  In practice, assessing macro-economic stability raises the question of the 
thresholds of macro-economic imbalances that lead to instability.  In general, the thresholds are 
defined a priori.  Hence, the comparison is based on the convergence, stability and economic 
growth pact of the WAEMU adopted in 2002.  Key criteria are a balanced fiscal budget 
(commitment basis) and an external account deficit (excluding grants) less than 5 percent of 
GDP.  As a member of the second monetary zone (West African Monetary Zone - WAMZ), 
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which was inspired by the WAEMU, Guinea is therefore comparable to WAEMU country 
members.    
Until 2002, the convergence, stability and economic growth criteria were not met. In general, 
fiscal deficits were above 5 percent of GDP.  In Guinea high deficits were associated with high 
inflation and broad money growth, low private investment rates and a decline of foreign 
exchange reserves over the 1986-2002 period. Between 1999 and 2003, the monetary fiscal deficit 
financing policy did not meet the regulatory ceiling of 20 percent of the previous year’s tax 
revenues, as authorized by the June 1994 law which created the BCRG (Doumbouya, 2004).  
Fiscal deficit financing through monetary policy resulted in high inflation rates, as analyzed by 
Blavy (2004).   
Breaking the period 1987-2002 in two sub-periods (1987-1993 and 1994-2002), it appears that all 
three variables (REER, terms of trade and inflation rate) are more volatile in Guinea over the 
1987-1994 sub-period (Table 2). Using a GARCH(1,1) method as in Serven (1998)1, it appeared 
that Togo’s inflation rates were more volatile in 1994 and 1998,  respectively (Figure 3).  Taking 
into account the devaluation effect and assuming a normal inflation rate of 3 percent, the 
volatility of inflation turned out to be higher in Guinea than the WAEMU countries over the 
1987-2002 period. 
 Before 1994, the volatility (measured by standard deviations) of the inflation rate is lower in 
WAEMU countries than in Guinea, due to the pegged exchange rate regime, supported by more 
disciplined budgetary policies. The reform program adopted in Guinea after the 1984 coup, 
resulted in a surge of inflation, culminating in an annual average rate of 65 percent in 1986 when 
the national currency was devalued by 92 percent, trade was liberalized and prices control (except 
those of fuel and rice) were removed (Blavy, 2004). As for WAEMU countries, trade was also 
liberalized and price control were removed during the same sub-period but no inflation occurred 
due to a disciplined monetary policy and the delayed devaluation of the CFA franc.   
After 1994, volatility remained higher in Guinea than in WAEMU countries, except for the 
inflation rate over the 1994-2002 sub-period. During this sub-period, Guinea was characterized 
by a relative stability, with inflation rate averaging less than 5 percent. However, external 
competitiveness remained weak due to a more volatile REER and terms of trade. Although the 
REER depreciated annually by an average of  5 percent throughout 1997 to 2002, the declining 
terms of trade of the same period counter-balanced the gains in competitiveness through its 
negative effect on revenues and put pressure on investment (both private and public) which kept 
on declining as shown by figure 2.  
 
 
                                                 
1 See Box 2 for details. 
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Table 2.  Standard Deviation ( percent) of the REER (z),  
The Terms of Trade (tde) and Inflation Rate (п), 1987-2002 
 
Figure 3.  Volatility of inflation rates measured as standard deviations 
Source: Author’s Estimates 
Since 1993 WAEMU countries, as well as Guinea, adopted a favourable real interest rate policy, 
which resulted in an increase of credit flows to the private sector but accrued credit remained 
marginal in Guinea.  During the 1986-1992 period, the nominal discount rate of the BCEAO 
fluctuated between 8.5 percent and 12.5 percent, against 9 percent and 19 percent  for the BCRG.  
While the inflation rate of Benin, Senegal and Togo was below 4 percent, it was high in Guinea, 
between 15.4 percent and 33.8 percent, over the 1986-1992 period. As a result, real interest rate 
was positive at about 8 percent in WAEMU countries while it was negative in Guinea.  The 
BCEAO reduced further its nominal discount rate to 6 percent in 1993, in view of contributing 
to the overall economic recovery policy adopted by its members since the CFA Franc was 
devalued in January 1994.  By contrast, the BCRG kept its nominal discount rate at a high level of 
about 16.5 percent, to  counter-balance the negative effect of inflation on the real interest rate.  
As a result, its real interest rate became positive, as opposed to the previous period of financial 
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repression.  However, the surge of inflation in 2003 could undermined the effect of this  positive 
real interest rate policy.  
Figure 4 suggests that the low nominal discount rate policy of the BCEAO and the positive real 
interest rate policy of the BCRG resulted in an increase of credit flows to the private sector over 
the 1995-2002 period.  However, accrued credit to the private sector in Guinea was marginal (less 
than 5 percent of GDP), compared to Benin, Senegal and Togo (more than 15 percent of GDP).   
 
Figure 4.  Trends of Flows and Total Outstanding Credit to the  Economy 
Source: Author’s Estimates 
Guinea’s foreign exchange reserves remained relatively low over the 1990s, compounded by weak 
mobilization of external resources, with regard to its high debt service ratio.  Foreign exchange 
availability is a key factor of private investment decision making, more in a fixed exchange rate 
regime than in a floating exchange rate regime. It reduces vulnerability to external shocks and 
international transaction costs of imports.  However, the CFA Franc Zone has more credibility 
because of the French Treasury’s guarantee and the pegging of the CFA Franc to the Euro.  
Therefore, availability of foreign currency could be less constraining in WAEMU countries.  By 
contrast, in Guinea, where the monetary and exchange rate policies accommodate fiscal policy 
and the exchange rate regime is not entirely liberalized, the need for higher levels of foreign 
exchange reserves could constrain private investment capacities.   
In practice, Senegal, Benin and Togo detained more foreign exchange than Guinea over the 1991-
2002 period1.  Their gross foreign reserves covered on annual average, 1.85, 5.17 and 4.31 months 
of imports, respectively. While Guinea’s reserves were only 1.56 months of imports,  Senegal had 
recorded an increasing trend of foreign reserves since 1994, from 1.36 months of imports in 1994 
to 3.39 in 2002.  Guinea’s low level of foreign reserves over the last two decades, combined with 
a higher debt service ratio (on average 17.6 percent of exports of goods and services, compared 
to 9.3 percent in Togo and 7.5 percent in Benin), could result in a higher external vulnerability, in 
the absence of external resources, as in the past few years (2002-2004).   
Overall, the statistical description showed that private investment performance was weak in 
Guinea and suggests that this weak performance could be explained by volatile macro-economic 
                                                 
1 Data are not available before 1991 in Guinea. 
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indicators. Indeed, this section showed that the real effective exchange rate, the terms of trade 
and the inflation rate are more volatile in Guinea than in Senegal, Benin and Togo, especially 
when the series are broken in two sub-periods (1987-1993 and 1994-2002). In addition, monetary 
and exchange rate policies indicators such as real interest rates, credits and gross foreign reserves 
recorded a weaker performance in Guinea, compared to Senegal, Benin and Togo.  The next 
section aims at testing a potential correlation between private investment rates and macro-
economic indicators. 
III.  DOES MACRO-ECONOMIC INSTABILITY MATTER? 
An Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Reduced Form of the Private Investment Function 
This section uses a simple accelerator econometric model-type (see annex 1), from Agénor 
(2000), where Tinvp is the private investment rate  (In/Y)1.  The investment function is therefore, 
defined by : 
Tinvp =f (ΔY, Ck, CE, R, IGI, IGO, z, σz, п, σп, RDE).   
In this equation, the accelerator effect of income is captured by the changes of the production 
(ΔY), approximated by g, the real growth rate of GDP.  The cost of using the capital, measured 
by Ck is approximated by the real interest rate (TIR).  Commercial banks’ credit to the economy 
(CE) is captured by the ratio of credit to the economy as a percentage of GDP (RCE).  Foreign 
exchange availability for external transactions (R) is measured by gross foreign exchange reserves 
expressed in months of imports (Rim).  Public investment is broken into a productive component 
IGI which is expected to be positively correlated to private investment, and a non-productive 
component, IGO, which behaves like final consumption and could have an ambiguous effect on 
private investment.  However, the reduced form of the private investment function will retain a 
unique public investment rate (TIG), as a proxy.  The real effective exchange rate (REER), 
defined as the profitability of tradable goods relative to non-tradable goods, is measured by z , 
with an ambiguous effect.  Macro-economic instability is captured through the standard 
deviations of the REER (σz), the inflation rate (п), and its standard deviations (σп).  While inflation 
rate is expected to have an ambiguous effect, the standard deviations of inflation and the REER 
are expected to be negatively correlated to private investment.  The external debt service ratio (as 
a  percentage of exports of goods and services), RDE, measures the effect of indebtedness on 
private investment, which can be threatened by anticipations of increasing taxes to reimburse 
debt (crowding-out effect of debt).   
According to the literature on private investment function in developing countries, terms of trade 
(TDE) and trade openness (RO) are additional key determinants (Serven, 1998).  Trade openness 
                                                 
1 The rationale of the choice of this reduced form is discussed in Annex 1. 
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is captured by the ratio of exports and imports to GDP.  A high trade openness could be 
beneficial to firms that operate in the tradable goods sector in terms of market (external and 
domestic) accessibility, provided that competitiveness (quality and price) is not incriminated.  The 
terms of trade reflect profitability of goods on the external market (exports) relative to the 
internal market (imports).  Therefore, the terms of trade are expected to be positively correlated 
to private investment.   
In addition, we included two dummy variables to capture the long-run effect of structural 
reforms implemented in the aftermath of the CFA Franc devaluation and the short-term effect of 
this devaluation, respectively, mue1 and mue2.  The former (mue1) is equal to zero before 1994 and 
is equal to 1 after 1994, while the later is equal to 1 in 1994 and zero for other years. Both 
dummies are equal to zero for Guinea.  The short-term effect of devaluation captured by mue2 is 
generally negative in developing countries because of the increase of capital cost on equipment 
which is predominantly imported  [Branson (1986) and Buffie (1986)].  By contrast, the long-run 
effect (mue1) associated with structural reforms such as economic liberalization (cancellation of 
non-tariff barriers, tariff reduction, financial liberalization, disciplined fiscal policy, etc.) is 
expected to have a positive correlation with private investment.   
Taking into account these proxies, the reduced form is written as follows : 
Tinvpit=β1git+β2TIRit+β3RCEit+β4Rimit+β5TIGit+β6zit+β7σzit+β8пit+β9σпit+ 
β10TDEit+β11RDEit+β12ROit+ β13mue1it+β14mue2it+ αi+µit 
βis are coefficients ; Tinvpit is the dependant variable ; µit represents the error term which is 
assumed to have a zero mean and a constant standard deviation ; and iα  represents unobserved 
individual characteristics of each country.   
The expected signs of each variable are as follows : 
β1>0, β2<0, β3>0, β4>0, β5±, β6±, β7<0, β8±, β9<0, β10>0, β11<0, β12>0, β13<0, β14>0.   
3.2 Data and Sources  
Data limitations are stringent and call therefore for caution in interpreting the results.  The 
empirical analysis is conducted using a panel data approach.  The individual dimension of data 
includes four countries (Benin, Guinea, Senegal and Togo) to fit with previous descriptive 
analyses.  The temporal dimension covers the 1987-2002 period (16 years).  The unbalanced 
panel data consists of 57 observations instead of 64 because of missing data.  Data are extracted 
from the World Development Indicators and  Country Live Database.  Some variables are 
approximated as follows :  
- TIR= {[1+ (i/100)]/ [(п/п-1)]-1}*100 as in the World Bank Africa Database (2004), with i 
representing the nominal discount rate ;  
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- (σп) and (σz) are approximated by the conditional standard deviations of the inflation rate and the 
REER, using a GARCH (1,1) method (see Box 2) on Eviews ;  
- RCE is the ratio of nominal credit flows to the economy as a percentage of nominal GDP. 
 
Box 2. Measuring Uncertainty 
 
The notion of uncertainty is given by the conditional variance of the innovation to a variable of interest 
(Serven, 1998). The approach to measure uncertainty (rather than just sample variability), is based on the 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) specification proposed by Serven (1998, 
2002). The GARCH(1,1) method is a simple equation in which the variable of interest, say Y, follows an AR(1) 
process with trend, as bellow: 
 
yit = α0 + α1t +β1yi,t-1 + ε i t ; t = 1, …, T;     (1) 
σ2it = γi0 + γ i 1ε2 i t-1 + δσ2 i t-1     (2) 
 
Where σ2t denotes the variance of εt conditional on information up to period t for each country i. For each of 
the variables of interest, we estimate the two-equation model (1)-(2) separately.  The fitted σ2 i t drawn from 
equation (2) are taken as the measure of uncertainty of y i t. 
 
The conditional variance drawn from the GARCH procedure is included in the private investment  equation, 
controlling for  conventional determinants. 
 
3.3 Econometric Estimation: Methodological Issues, Tests and Results 
Two necessary conditions need to be met while using a panel data model1.  The first one is the 
Lagrangian multiplier test of Breusch-Pagan (LM-test), which tests the absence of specific effects 
(the null hypothesis of uniform characteristics of countries or pooled model) against the presence 
of specific effects (alternative hypothesis of mixed/diversed characteristics of countries). The 
second one is the specification test of Hausman, which tests exogeneity of independent variables 
with regard to the random component of residuals (null hypothesis). When the temporal 
dimension of the panel data is small, the Hausman test consists of testing random specific effects 
(null hypothesis) against fixed specific effects (alternative hypothesis).   
The required tests are held through Stata 6.0 (see annex 3).  The LM-test of Breusch-Pagan does 
not reject the alternative hypothesis of existence of specific characteristics by country, given the 
high value of the Chi-square (low probability).  However, the additional test of Chow (F-test), 
does not reject the homogeneity of these specific characteristics within each country.  The 
specification test of Hausman does not reject the alternative hypothesis of endogeneity of 
independent variables, given the high value of the Chi-square (low probability) (Table 3).  The 
results of these tests suggest therefore a WITHIN method to estimate the reduced form of the 
private investment model.  This method estimates the reduced form, using a first-differencing of 
each variable to its average value. Therefore, it removes the time-invariant disturbance of the 
panel. However, it does not solve effectively the endogeneity issue raised above (Hausman and 
                                                 
1 Given the small temporal dimension of the panel, we assume that tests that discriminate between Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) models and Pooled models are not relevant. 
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Taylor, 1981). A standard approach to fix the endogeneity problem consists of using a GMM 
method (Serven, 1998), provided that the time dimension of the data is long enough to satisfy 
identification conditions, due to the use of 2-lagged variables as instruments. Notwithstanding the 
superiority of the GMM estimator on the WITHIN estimator, we kept the latter, given the small 
time dimension of the data.     
Overall, the model performs well in explaining the private investment rate at 79 percent, with a 
broad significance level of independent variables at 1 percent (F-test).  Only variables that are 
statistically significant at levels of 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent are reported in the Table 3 
below.  While the ratio of debt service and the real interest rate are negatively correlated to the 
private investment rate, public investment rate, the ratio of credit to the economy, inflation rate 
and terms of trade have positive relationships but none of these variables is significantly different 
from zero.  This finding may suggest that, as neither the inflation rate nor its volatility threaten 
the private investment rate, it may be because of predominance of WAEMU countries in our 
sample.   
Table 3.  Determinants of the Private Investment Rate  (Tinvp, dependent variable) 
Independent Variables  Coefficients (Significance) 
Real Growth rate (g) 0,0998 (0.062) a 
Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves (Rim) 0,444 (0.001) 
Real Effective Exchange Rate (Z) 0,1751 (0.000) 
Standard Deviation of Z (σz) 0,032 (0.000) 
Trade Openess (RO) 0,164 (0.000) 
Dummy for Structural Reforms After 
1994 (mue1) 3,222 (0.003) 
Dummy for Devaluation Effect in 1994 
(mue2) -1,486 (0.094) a 
Individual Constant (α1-Guinea) -9,33 (0.000) 
Individual Constant (α2-Benin) -20,927 (0.000) 
Individual Constant (α3-Senegal) -17,006 (0.000) 
Individual Constant (α4-Togo) -24,315 (0.000) 
F statistic 435,11 (0.000) 
R2 0,788 
Adjusted-R2  0,775 
Breusch-Pagan (Chi2) 26,25 (0.000) 
Hausman test (Chi2) 254,08 (0,000) 
Chow test (F-test) 34,31 (0.000) 
  
Source: Author’s Estimates 
 ( )  Numbers between brackets correspond to significance levels  associated with t-Student values; 
 (a) Indicates significance at 10 percent level. 
 
All the variables of the model have expected signs, except the standard deviation of the REER.  
The effect of a change in GDP on the private investment rate is positive and statistically 
significant, and reflects the accelerator effect. The availability of foreign exchange reserves has a 
positive effect on the private investment rate.  This may suggest that low levels of foreign 
exchange reserves are detrimental to private investment. This interpretation is supported by the 
Guinea’s experience over the 1987-2002 period, as seen in section 1. Although there is still a 
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debate about the effect of trade openness on growth and investment, the model’s findings show a 
positive effect on the private investment rate. This result is supported by the countries 
concerned, which rest heavily on imports of equipment and export of raw materials. In this 
context, investment decision-making in these countries would depend on the profitability of 
domestic markets, measured by the REER.  The positive effect of this variable reflects the 
competitiveness achieved by the countries, notably after 1994.  However, the positive effect of 
the standard deviation of the REER is counterintuitive, suggesting that external competitiveness 
is stable and persistent over time, as shown by Figure 5.  The stability of the REER could 
therefore be interpreted as a positive sign of the profitability of domestic markets to private 
investment.  The expected results of the dummies are in line with the model’s findings, suggesting 
that devaluation combined with structural reforms has a positive effect on the private investment 
rate in the medium and long term. 
 
Figure 5.  Evolution of the Real Effective Exchange Rate, 1987-2002 
Source: Author’s Estimates 
 
Finally, individual country characteristics captured by α1 (Guinea), α2 (Benin), α3 (Senegal) and 
α4 (Togo) suggest the existence of strong negative unobserved factors at different levels (low for 
Guinea and high for Togo). This finding may suggest that a country case by case approach  is 
worth to be considered.  For instance, the lack of variables capturing economic potential 
attractiveness (availability of natural resources), corruption, governance and political instability 
could put severe limitations on the findings of the model.    
The availability of natural resources is potentially more favorable to Guinea’s attractiveness of 
foreign investors, as it may be reflected by the lowest negative effects of its characteristics (α1).  
However, corruption has significant macroeconomic effects on the Guinean economy as it 
significantly taints the general business environment and raises the cost of doing business (World 
Bank, 2004).  On the macro-economic side, it reduces the effectiveness of policy changes, and 
severely reduces fiscal revenues.  On the business side, it increases transaction costs.  According 
to the Bank Group’s “Doing business in 2005”, transaction costs of starting a business, 
regulations of ongoing business, and regulations of factor markets (land and labor) and financial 
markets (access to credit and quality of information) are higher in Guinea than the sub-regional 
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
160.0
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
S é né ga l z B é nin z T o go  z G uiné e  z
Issa, draft of November 16, 2008 16
averages. Hence, improvement of the business climate, combined with macro-stability, is 
necessary to create an environment conducive to private investment, given the strong economic 
potential of Guinea.   
3.4 An Error Correction Model Approach for Guinea 
The mining sector led investment rate may create some data limitations and methodological 
issues in interpreting the results. A time-series data set, covering the period 1987-2003, is built to 
explore the empirical relation between investment and macroeconomic uncertainty. The results 
should be interpreted with caution, given some data limitations, notably the private investment 
rate figures (see Box 1). For instance, the results can be limited by the dominance of the mining 
sector in the private investment figures in Guinea, because this sector may react as an enclave, 
benefiting from various incentives embedded in the investment code, the environment code and 
the mining code which may therefore externalize the sensitivity of the mining sector to 
macroeconomic uncertainties (Campbell, 2004)1.  
Notwithstanding the measurement problems and eventual bias, the empirical specification 
consists of using the (log of the) private fixed investment/GDP ratio as dependent variable. The 
explanatory variables include the conditional variances of the innovations to the variables of 
interest as obtained from the GARCH(1,1) procedure described in Box 2. In addition to these 
variables, the conventional accelerator effect is captured by the current and lagged levels of  (the 
log of) real GDP. Given the small size of the sample, the conventional approach to the 
estimation is based on a single equation error correction model, which reduced further the sample 
size to 14 observations (1990-2003). Additional tests of Serial Correlation and Homoskedasticity 
Test resulted in a non-rejection of serial independence of residuals and their related constant 
variances (homoskedasticity) (see Annex 4). The final estimates are shown in Table 4. 
The increasing volatility of real effective exchange rate, inflation rate and the terms of trade have 
not threaten directly the private investment ratio, during the last fifteen years, in contrast with the 
negative impact of financial sector’s variables. Indeed, the 1990-2003 period covered by the 
estimation, is characterized by moderate inflation rates (less than 5 percent on average, except 
2003), low (but increasing) level of the volatility of  real effective exchange rate and declining 
terms of trade. Although these indicators create uncertainties for private investors in terms of 
profitability and the cost of investment, the estimates show no evidence of direct negative impact 
on private investment ratio. In other words, the level of volatility is not high enough to threaten 
                                                 
1 Campbell argued that the 1990s policy reforms in the mining sector in Guinea, occurred in an increasing 
externalisation of the policy process in the area of natural resource management, in which foreign technology, 
training, and finance are called upon to assume a more active and even decisive role. As a result, the developments in 
the Guinean mining sector illustrate the country’s difficulty in negotiating financial terms for the conditions of 
extraction of its key resources (bauxite and alumina), in order to maintain minimally stable resources from this critical 
sector.  
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private investment rates, but this result draws the attention on their potential negative impact if 
the reversed situation observed since 2003 is maintained in medium and long terms.  
In addition, the volatility indicators reduce the incentives of the financial sector to offer credit to 
the private sector, as reflected by the negative impacts of the real lending rate and the credit flow 
to the economy. According to the Creditor and Borrower Legal Rights Index (World Bank, 
2004), which measures how well collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending, Guinea has a 
very low score of 2, compared with a regional average of 4.61. With respect to credit reporting 
systems, Guinea has a score of 2 in the Credit Information Index, compared with a regional 
average of 2.1 and an OECD average of  5.02. Hence, one can argue that the legal and judiciary 
systems are not favorable to efficient financial intermediation, including the use of collateral. 
Banks are generally risk averse and prefer to finance trade, and short term lending at high interest 
rates, leaving few amount of capital to finance the development needs of the private sector.  
 
Table 4.  Impact of Macroeconomic Uncertainties on Private Investment Ratio in Guinea 
 
                                                 
1 The Legal Rights Index ranges from 0-10, with higher scores indicating that those laws are better designed to 
expand access to credit. 
2 The Credit Information Index measures the scope, access and quality of credit information available through 
public registries or private bureaus.  The index ranges from 0-6, with higher values indicating that more credit 
information is available from a public registry or a private bureau. 
Dependent Variable: D(Log of Gross Private Investment Ratio)*
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1990 2003
Included observations: 14 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -2.487 0.502 -4.957 0.016
D(Real Lend. Rate) -0.003 0.001 -2.759 0.070
D(Real Eff. Exch. Rate Uncertainty) 0.047 0.009 4.982 0.016
D(Log of Ratio of Priv. Inv. Defl. to GDP Defl.) 0.941 0.154 6.097 0.009
D(1-lagged Log of Gross Private Invest. Ratio) -1.514 0.161 -9.423 0.003
1-lagged Credit Flow to the Economy -0.033 0.009 -3.575 0.037
1-lagged Terms of Trade Uncertainty 0.002 0.001 4.172 0.025
2-lagged Inflation Rate 0.017 0.005 3.132 0.052
1-lagged Real Eff. Exch. Rate Uncertainty 0.049 0.017 2.796 0.068
2-lagged (Log of Ratio of Priv. Inv. Defl. to GDP Defl.) 0.823 0.198 4.162 0.025
2-lagged Real Lending Rate 0.007 0.003 2.399 0.096
R-squared 0.986     Mean dependent var -0.006
Adjusted R-squared 0.938     S.D. dependent var 0.097
S.E. of regression 0.024     Akaike info criterion -4.582
Sum squared resid 0.002     Schwarz criterion -4.080
Log likelihood 43.077     F-statistic 20.628
Durbin-Watson stat 2.088     Prob(F-statistic) 0.015
* D = First Difference
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IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Using a comparative approach between Guinea and WAEMU countries, this paper explored the 
relationship between macro-instability and the private investment rate, controlling for macro-
economic classical determinants.  The findings support the view that the negative relationship 
between macro-economic instability and private investment occurs only when the volatility of 
macro-economic variables is high enough to transmit negative signals to private investors.  While 
the volatility of inflation and the terms of trade are found to be statistically insignificant, the 
volatility of the real effective exchange rate is found to be significantly different from zero with a 
rather counterintuitive positive effect on the private investment ratio.  This finding may suggest 
that the countries concerned by this empirical analysis are not yet facing the negative effects of 
macro-instability. In the specific case of Guinea, built on a single error correction model, it may 
also suggest some evidence of ‘enclave effect’ of the mining sector. Given the scope of incentives 
offered to the mining sector and its leading role in Guinea, the private investment rate may not 
react negatively to the wrong market signals created by the macro-instability indicators. However, 
this assumption could not be explored because of the lack of detailed data by sector of 
investment.     
On a policy perspective, this counter-intuitive impact draws the attention on the current 
increasing volatility of macro-economic indicators.  This is an important issue, with regard to the 
surge of double-digit inflation since 2003, driven by combined effects of monetary financing of 
fiscal deficit and the official and un-official Guinean franc depreciations.  Unless it is quickly and 
effectively managed, recent acceleration of inflation could have a negative effect on domestic 
prices and hence on competitiveness and foreign exchange reserves. Finally, the negative indirect 
impact of macroeconomic instability (measured by the real lending rate and the flow of credit to 
the economy) on the private sector investment suggests additional efforts to improve the overall 
macroeconomic context and especially, an in-depth openness of the financial sector, to diversify 
the variables of credit to the private sector.    
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ANNEX 1 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
The Private Investment Function in Theory 
The analysis of macro-economic determinants of private investment is generally based on the flexible accelerator 
model. The pioneer simple accelerator model assumed a long-term relationship between investment (In) and income 
(Y) (Abraham-Frois, 1991). The net investment rate (In/Y) is defined as an increasing function of the growth rate 
((Y-Y-1)/Y) plus a constant term, assuming a full utilization of capital : 
 
In/Y=k(Y-Y-1)/Y+ak     (1) 
Where k is the ICOR (Incremental Capital Output Ratio) and a the depreciation rate of capital. 
Equation 1 was extended to the flexible accelerator model by taking into account anticipative behaviours and delayed 
adjustments of capital to the growth of income. As a result, net investment was set as a function of the growth of 
income, following an adapting anticipation process : 
 
In=k(Ya+1-Ya)      (2) 
Where Ya+1=λY+(1-λ)Ya  (0<λ<1) is the anticipated income in t for next period  (t+1) and λ is the adjustment 
coefficient. Using a Koyck process, equation 2 is derived as : 
 
In=λk(Y-Y-1)+(1-λ)I-1     (3)  
And the investment rate is defined by  : 
 
(In/Y)=λk[(Y-Y-1)/ Y-1]+(1-λ)( In-1/ Y-1)   (4) 
λk and (1-λ) are positive.   
Other authors emphasized the negative effect of the capital cost on private investment. Pioneer economists such as 
Keynes and Fisher approximated the capital cost by using nominal and real interest rates, respectively. Jorgensen 
(1963)1, defined capital cost as the opportunity cost of investing instead of saving. This opportunity cost (Ck) is set as 
a function of the price of capital goods (Pk), the real interest rate (i-ΔPk/Pk), where  i  is the nominal interest rate and 
(ΔPk/Pk) is the inflation rate, measured in terms of Pk and δ, the depreciation rate of capital : 
 
Ck=Pk(i+δ-ΔPk/Pk)     (5)  
Then Jorgensen derived a simple accelerator model, augmented by the impact of the capital cost (known as the 
accelerator-cost of capital model) : 
In=f(ΔY, Δ(Ck/Pk))      (6)  
ΔY and Ck/Pk are assumed to correlate, respectively, positively and negatively to In. Although generalized, this model 
faces three main limits (Villieu, 2000) : it assumes that income is exogenous, in contrast with the neoclassical 
investment function based on profit maximization.  In profit maximization, demand for factors and supply of goods 
are derived simultaneously, so that private investment is a function of the relative cost of factors (capital and labour). 
Therefore equation 6 becomes :  
In=f(Δ(Ck/Pk), Δ(W/Pk))     (7)  
where W and Pk represent, respectively, the cost of labour and the unit price of capital, set equal to the price of 
goods.   
                                                 
1 In Villieu P.  (2000) : Macroéconomie : l’investissement,.  Paris,  La Découverte, Repères, pp.23-27. 
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In addition, Jorgensen’s model is weakened by the introduction of an ex post cost of installed investment, assuming 
that anticipations are myopic. And finally, capital cost is derived, assuming that capital demand follows a decreasing 
return to scale as in the neoclassical model. However, for technical reasons, researchers may use a constant return to 
scale function.   
In regard to these limits, the neo-classical model was amended by taking into account an exogenous market 
opportunity constraint, which gives Keynesian foundation to the model. It also allows the derivation of factor 
demand and goods supply, even in the presence of a constant return to scale. This improvement resulted in the 
accelerator-relative cost of factor model : 
In=f(ΔY, Δ(Wk/Ck))      (8)  
However, this model does not explain private investment behaviour when uncertainty and irreversibility issues are 
questioned, as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). In the context of irreversibility, the investor adopts a wait-and-see 
behaviour, due to uncertainties. According to Arrow (1968)1, he will postpone the decision to invest as long as the 
expected return on his investment is lower than the capital cost. Consequently, uncertainties are a major disincentive 
to private investment, mainly in developing countries.   
Review of Empirical Studies in Developing Countries 
Recent economic literature emphasized  the impact that uncertainties and macro-economic instability have on private 
investment in developing countries.  Serven (1998) identified 5 macro-economic determinants of private investment:  
the economic growth rate, inflation rate, relative price of equipment goods, terms of trade and real exchange rate.  
Combining uncertainties, irreversibility and macro-economic volatility, he found a negative impact on private 
investment in sub-Saharan African countries over the 1980s and 1990s, in particular, when uncertainties are captured 
by the volatility of the exchange rate (Serven, 2002).  Other authors [Pattillo (1997), Aizenman and Marion (1999)], 
achieved the same results in Ghana.   
In addition to the variables mentioned above, some authors (Oshikoya, 1994, and Hadjimichael and Ghura, 1995) 
showed that  private investment decisions in developing countries depend mainly on the country’s access to credit 
and foreign exchange (positive correlation), public investment rate (ambiguous correlation), burden of external debt 
(negative correlation), terms of trade and trade openness or restrictiveness.  Oshikoya used a simple accelerator 
model, focusing on 4 middle-income and 4 low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the 1970s and 1980s.  
He found a positive and significant acceleration effect on income only for the low-income countries of his sample 
and explained this correlation by myopic anticipations or short-term decision-making of investors; however, the 
complementary effect of public investment was more significant in middle-income countries.  More importantly, he 
found that macro-economic indicators such as the exchange rate and inflation rate have a positive and significant 
effect in the middle-income countries, in contrast with low-income countries.  However, macro-instability measured 
by the standard deviation of the exchange rate has a negative impact in both types of countries over the 80’s.   
Beside macro-economic variables, the business climate, governance and corruption issues have been constantly on 
the rise in the past few years as key determinants of the sources of growth and investment in developing countries  
Studies that focused on this aspect generally assume that corruption is a measure of the impact of quality of 
governance on economic efficiency.  Mauro (1993) found that countries with a high CPI (corruption perception 
index) recorded the lowest investment rates (including private investment rates).  Moreover, Mauro (1995) showed 
that corruption and the business climate, notably the judiciary environment and property rights, are negatively 
correlated with economic growth.  North (1990) emphasized the strong correlation between the efficiency of a 
country’s judiciary system and its economic performance.  Overall, uncertainties on property rights, profits and 
licences could reduce private incentives and the decision to invest, innovate and attract foreign direct investment.   
However, recent literature on corruption and governance issues is in contradiction with previous research findings.  
Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968), argued that economic growth can be driven by corruption through two 
mechanisms.  Bribes could : (i) accelerate administrative procedures and ; (ii) encourage civil servants to work faster 
on cumbersome and complex procedures.  Rose-Ackerman (1978) warned that it is difficult to contain corruption 
where it is economically desired, while Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argued that corruption is detrimental to economic 
growth.   
Notwithstanding the relevance of the debate, this paper does not take into account the governance and corruption 
issues because of a lack of a temporal series for the countries of our sample.  Nor does it deal with the theoretical 
                                                 
1 In Villieu P.  (2000), Op.  Cit.  p.41 
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debate between simple accelerator and flexible accelerator models, notably when it goes along with private 
investment behavior in developing countries.  However, taking stock of empirical studies, Agénor (2000) found that 
the simple accelerator model makes more sense in developing countries, assuming a zero capital depreciation rate 
and no anticipation process (expected income is equal to current income).  The rationale of this approach rests on 
the lack of transparent markets and the prevailing financial repression which limit the use of the flexible accelerator 
model of investment in most of the developing countries.    
ANNEX 2 
 
Benin Series 
 
  Tinvp g TIG Tir RCE z σz Rim п σп RDE TDE Ro 
1987 7,7 -1,5 5,4 9,3 -1,7 97,3  0,2 3,0  7,8 73,6 46,2 
1988 5,7 3,4 4,7 10,7 2,7 97,3 56,6 0,2 -0,6 61,3 7,5 81,1 45,9 
1989 3,8 -2,9 6,6 14,2 -7,3 95,9 68,4 0,2 2,2 71,9 6,9 77,4 38,3 
1990 6,6 3,2 8,2 11,9 -0,2 97,5 75,7 1,7 1,6 80,9 8,2 100,0 40,6 
1991 6,3 4,7 7,7 14,5 -3,0 96,3 76,6 2,6 0,7 85,0 4,6 88,5 43,6 
1992 7,4 4,0 7,3 8,2 -2,9 100,0 78,9 3,9 3,4 86,8 4,2 80,1 43,4 
1993 8,6 3,5 7,8 5,0 -0,3 99,8 71,4 3,9 1,2 89,4 4,7 77,3 41,9 
1994 4,2 4,4 6,3 -23,1 0,9 67,3 69,7 4,8 33,5 89,2 6,4 75,9 50,1 
1995 5,5 4,6 8,4 -7,4 0,5 77,5 0,3 2,6 15,4 0,4 6,8 100,0 53,2 
1996 7,7 6,0 6,3 1,0 1,9 79,5 38,7 3,9 6,7 41,6 6,0 88,2 45,3 
1997 9,4 5,7 4,4 2,4 0,5 78,0 59,7 3,8 5,0 63,8 8,7 93,3 45,0 
1998 9,8 4,6 4,0 0,3 2,1 83,9 70,3 3,9 4,7 76,6 9,1 93,3 44,6 
1999 10,0 4,7 4,1 5,6 3,6 81,0 76,3 5,4 1,9 83,7 10,1 94,1 45,0 
2000 10,5 5,8 4,0 1,8 2,5 84,6 81,1 7,3 3,3 86,2 11,0 94,1 43,3 
2001 10,9 5,0 3,8 2,0 0,0 86,3 81,7 8,8 3,1 88,9 7,9 94,2 43,1 
2002 11,6 5,8 3,5 3,3 1,4 89,6 80,7 8,8 1,9 90,2 9,6 96,0 40,4 
 
Benin, Correlation Matrix 
 
  
Guinea Series 
 
  Tinvp g TIG Tir RCE z σz Rim п σп RDE TDE Ro 
1987 12,9 3,3 6,6 -20,7 1,5 100,0     38,7   27,2 135,9 58,4
1988 12,7 6,3 7,1 -4,3 1,7 75,6 2,7  15,0 77,5 21,1 121,3 58,0
1989 12,4 4,0 7,0 -5,6 0,6 77,2 3,7  18,6 1,1 16,4 133,3 60,9
1990 11,7 4,4 7,9 -8,3 1,0 72,5 5,5  23,3 48,7 20,0 135,0 61,5
1991 12,7 0,8 7,9 -6,1 0,4 75,8 3,9 0,8 25,1 49,4 16,0 130,0 46,2
1992 12,5 2,9 8,0 -13,4 0,8 70,3 4,7 1,0 32,4 121,4 12,7 103,4 45,0
1993 11,5 4,2 7,0 21,2 0,4 73,0 5,2 1,6 -4,2 409,1 11,1 95,4 45,7
1994 11,1 6,3 5,9 16,8 1,1 71,4 6,1 0,9 4,2 78,8 14,3 111,2 47,7
1995 11,1 4,4 5,5 13,4 0,8 67,3 6,5 0,9 5,6 50,0 25,0 100,0 45,3
1996 11,4 4,6 5,0 12,0 0,2 69,0 9,8 1,0 3,0 31,4 14,7 86,8 43,3
1997 11,5 5,0 5,3 10,1 0,0 68,5 11,4 1,5 1,9 78,3 20,7 97,2 43,0
1998 11,5 4,8 4,9 6,9 0,7 65,9 8,9 2,6 5,1 17,1 19,5 88,5 46,6
1999 11,3 4,6 5,1 9,4 0,7 62,0 8,3 2,3 4,6 33,8 16,4 85,7 48,6
2000 11,7 1,9 5,3 8,2 0,4 55,6 12,4 1,8 6,8 10,6 20,4 111,1 52,3
2001 12,0 3,8 5,4 10,6 0,4 55,4 8,5 2,4 5,4 48,7 12,3 111,1 56,0
2002 8,1 4,2 5,5 14,0 0,5 55,3 5,8 1,9 3,0 1,8 13,6 111,1 54,0
TINVP G п RCE RDE Rim Ro TDE TIG Tir σп σz Z
TINVP 1.000 0.611 -0.425 0.513 0.562 0.794 -0.271 0.517 -0.682 0.071 0.337 0.385 -0.052
G 0.611 1.000 0.117 0.744 0.231 0.607 0.410 0.481 -0.326 -0.374 -0.038 -0.060 -0.424
п -0.425 0.117 1.000 0.110 -0.139 0.062 0.693 -0.216 0.182 -0.916 -0.199 -0.322 -0.746
RCE 0.513 0.744 0.110 1.000 0.552 0.402 0.428 0.419 -0.508 -0.396 -0.098 -0.117 -0.471
RDE 0.562 0.231 -0.139 0.552 1.000 0.435 -0.100 0.603 -0.751 -0.074 0.103 0.189 -0.343
Rim 0.794 0.607 0.062 0.402 0.435 1.000 -0.063 0.344 -0.593 -0.343 0.386 0.375 -0.332
Ro -0.271 0.410 0.693 0.428 -0.100 -0.063 1.000 0.097 0.152 -0.717 -0.621 -0.698 -0.676
TDE 0.517 0.481 -0.216 0.419 0.603 0.344 0.097 1.000 -0.230 0.048 -0.285 -0.188 -0.220
TIG -0.682 -0.326 0.182 -0.508 -0.751 -0.593 0.152 -0.230 1.000 0.080 -0.322 -0.384 0.291
Tir 0.071 -0.374 -0.916 -0.396 -0.074 -0.343 -0.717 0.048 0.080 1.000 0.188 0.309 0.841
σп 0.337 -0.038 -0.199 -0.098 0.103 0.386 -0.621 -0.285 -0.322 0.188 1.000 0.982 0.316
σz 0.385 -0.060 -0.322 -0.117 0.189 0.375 -0.698 -0.188 -0.384 0.309 0.982 1.000 0.367
Z -0.052 -0.424 -0.746 -0.471 -0.343 -0.332 -0.676 -0.220 0.291 0.841 0.316 0.367 1.000
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Guinea, Correlation Matrix 
 
  
Senegal, Series 
 
  Tinvp g TIG Tir RCE z σz Rim п σп RDE TDE Ro 
1987 8,3 4,0 4,1 13,1 0,9 100,0   0,2 2,0   32,4 108,0 55,5
1988 8,5 5,1 3,8 11,5 1,9 93,8 39,5 0,2 2,1 41,8 31,4 106,6 51,9
1989 8,5 -1,4 4,0 10,5 0,7 88,5 46,8 0,2 0,9 52,9 28,7 110,0 58,8
1990 8,3 3,9 3,8 10,7 -2,0 90,3 51,4 0,1 1,2 58,8 20,0 110,0 55,8
1991 8,7 -0,4 3,9 13,0 -1,0 84,6 45,8 0,1 0,4 62,3 20,9 109,2 54,6
1992 8,8 2,2 4,4 12,7 1,5 84,3 49,8 0,1 0,6 63,9 13,5 109,5 50,8
1993 9,2 -2,2 3,5 6,5 0,4 82,2 46,3 0,1 -1,4 64,9 9,1 106,9 50,3
1994 10,2 2,9 2,9 -19,8 -7,5 53,1 44,2 1,4 27,8 63,7 17,1 85,0 76,5
1995 9,3 5,2 3,6 -1,7 0,4 57,6 0,1 1,6 5,0 0,2 16,7 100,0 74,6
1996 8,9 5,1 5,1 3,1 2,6 58,0 25,8 1,9 1,0 29,2 18,9 105,8 65,3
1997 8,6 5,0 5,3 4,4 1,9 54,1 40,1 2,7 2,5 45,1 17,2 80,4 65,0
1998 9,7 5,7 6,0 4,8 1,6 55,3 47,6 2,7 1,7 54,9 20,6 83,5 67,4
1999 10,8 5,0 7,3 5,1 1,6 54,0 51,2 2,4 1,4 60,3 14,3 73,3 68,8
2000 10,9 5,6 5,7 5,3 4,5 50,8 53,2 2,4 0,8 63,3 13,8 63,9 69,7
2001 11,4 5,6 6,0 2,7 0,9 50,5 54,8 2,7 2,8 64,6 12,0 61,6 70,3
2002 8,6 1,5 5,3 3,7 0,9 50,2 52,7 3,4 2,7 66,2 12,6 61,7 72,2
 
Senegal, Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
TINVP G п RCE RDE Rim Ro TDE TIG Tir σп σz Z
TINVP 1.000 -0.401 0.480 -0.002 0.040 -0.222 -0.372 0.073 0.427 -0.513 0.203 0.028 0.473
G -0.401 1.000 -0.635 0.244 0.006 0.157 -0.166 -0.591 -0.546 0.646 0.078 0.146 0.022
п 0.480 -0.635 1.000 0.242 -0.108 -0.419 -0.147 0.463 0.725 -0.961 -0.186 -0.442 0.296
RCE -0.002 0.244 0.242 1.000 0.028 -0.061 0.107 0.024 0.110 -0.103 -0.106 -0.409 0.055
RDE 0.040 0.006 -0.108 0.028 1.000 -0.029 -0.251 -0.132 -0.418 0.033 -0.438 0.448 -0.063
Rim -0.222 0.157 -0.419 -0.061 -0.029 1.000 0.571 -0.333 -0.554 0.247 -0.157 0.425 -0.682
Ro -0.372 -0.166 -0.147 0.107 -0.251 0.571 1.000 0.390 -0.246 0.171 -0.289 0.092 -0.838
TDE 0.073 -0.591 0.463 0.024 -0.132 -0.333 0.390 1.000 0.513 -0.326 -0.140 -0.382 0.003
TIG 0.427 -0.546 0.725 0.110 -0.418 -0.554 -0.246 0.513 1.000 -0.601 0.478 -0.750 0.591
Tir -0.513 0.646 -0.961 -0.103 0.033 0.247 0.171 -0.326 -0.601 1.000 0.260 0.253 -0.218
σп 0.203 0.078 -0.186 -0.106 -0.438 -0.157 -0.289 -0.140 0.478 0.260 1.000 -0.373 0.471
σz 0.028 0.146 -0.442 -0.409 0.448 0.425 0.092 -0.382 -0.750 0.253 -0.373 1.000 -0.487
Z 0.473 0.022 0.296 0.055 -0.063 -0.682 -0.838 0.003 0.591 -0.218 0.471 -0.487 1.000
TINVP G п RCE RDE Rim Ro TDE TIG Tir σп σz Z
TINVP 1.000 0.428 0.240 0.050 -0.461 0.495 0.569 -0.696 0.544 -0.422 0.230 0.223 -0.641
G 0.428 1.000 0.082 0.276 0.013 0.561 0.496 -0.439 0.513 -0.217 -0.360 -0.215 -0.535
п 0.240 0.082 1.000 -0.814 -0.010 0.078 0.523 -0.159 -0.363 -0.896 0.038 -0.094 -0.313
RCE 0.050 0.276 -0.814 1.000 -0.025 0.278 -0.165 -0.176 0.586 0.619 -0.168 -0.007 -0.085
RDE -0.461 0.013 -0.010 -0.025 1.000 -0.401 -0.290 0.483 -0.287 0.265 -0.285 -0.156 0.526
Rim 0.495 0.561 0.078 0.278 -0.401 1.000 0.793 -0.878 0.735 -0.372 -0.023 0.041 -0.927
Ro 0.569 0.496 0.523 -0.165 -0.290 0.793 1.000 -0.718 0.357 -0.752 -0.217 -0.229 -0.899
TDE -0.696 -0.439 -0.159 -0.176 0.483 -0.878 -0.718 1.000 -0.686 0.365 -0.303 -0.346 0.833
TIG 0.544 0.513 -0.363 0.586 -0.287 0.735 0.357 -0.686 1.000 0.147 0.184 0.326 -0.588
Tir -0.422 -0.217 -0.896 0.619 0.265 -0.372 -0.752 0.365 0.147 1.000 0.116 0.245 0.620
σп 0.230 -0.360 0.038 -0.168 -0.285 -0.023 -0.217 -0.303 0.184 0.116 1.000 0.962 0.077
σz 0.223 -0.215 -0.094 -0.007 -0.156 0.041 -0.229 -0.346 0.326 0.245 0.962 1.000 0.087
Z -0.641 -0.535 -0.313 -0.085 0.526 -0.927 -0.899 0.833 -0.588 0.620 0.077 0.087 1.000
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Togo, Series 
 
  Tinvp g TIG Tir RCE z σz Rim п σп RDE TDE Ro 
1987 15,5 0,5 11,1 8,4 1,3 151,9   6,2 1,7   16,3 130,8 92,1
1988 22,1 6,6 8,1 9,7 0,9 144,5 100,9 3,7 2,6 128,5 22,6 134,2 96,3
1989 20,1 4,1 8,1 11,9 -0,8 134,3 119,1 4,8 1,0 15,6 15,6 131,5 88,5
1990 22,7 -0,2 8,5 9,9 1,5 138,9 133,2 4,7 3,0 50,2 11,9 133,4 78,8
1991 17,0 -0,7 5,2 10,6 2,6 132,0 127,1 4,9 2,7 38,5 7,7 126,4 75,0
1992 15,8 -4,0 3,3 11,0 -1,2 134,1 136,1 4,1 3,2 42,1 6,1 127,8 63,1
1993 10,3 -15,1 1,7 7,1 -2,5 129,5 130,3 3,7 -8,2 42,6 6,8 91,1 56,5
1994 10,1 15,0 1,9 -23,8 -0,4 86,2 134,8 2,2 35,8 231,9 5,4 95,6 64,8
1995 10,0 7,8 2,8 -9,0 4,1 100,0 0,5 2,2 11,1 1784,7 6,0 100,0 69,8
1996 13,9 8,8 2,8 1,3 3,8 102,4 68,2 1,3 5,4 23,0 9,5 93,4 77,4
1997 12,9 4,3 2,1 -2,1 1,1 104,8 104,7 1,9 11,9 92,8 10,1 99,7 73,8
1998 15,2 -2,1 4,4 5,0 2,0 109,0 125,2 1,8 -2,4 222,2 7,5 114,8 81,8
1999 14,9 2,4 3,7 6,1 -5,3 104,9 132,7 2,1 2,3 1,1 8,9 114,8 75,3
2000 16,3 -1,9 3,3 4,0 0,1 98,5 140,4 2,8 1,3 54,3 6,3 100,6 81,9
2001 17,0 -0,2 2,6 2,0 -1,1 101,7 144,5 2,2 6,4 38,9 6,4 106,8 82,4
2002 14,4 4,6 4,1 2,8 -0,9 105,4 143,1 3,3 -0,1 67,8 2,5 104,0 83,1
 
Togo, Correlation Matrix 
 
 
TINVP G п RCE RDE Rim Ro TDE TIG Tir σп σz Z
TINVP 1.000 -0.051 0.895 0.678 0.019 0.674 0.309 0.572 -0.355 -0.414 0.677 0.852 0.728
G -0.051 1.000 0.059 -0.617 0.336 -0.434 -0.385 -0.365 0.749 0.286 0.159 -0.063 0.314
п 0.895 0.059 1.000 0.578 0.118 0.725 0.102 0.663 -0.305 -0.184 0.725 0.866 0.673
RCE 0.678 -0.617 0.578 1.000 -0.166 0.777 0.291 0.595 -0.870 -0.442 0.394 0.645 0.351
RDE 0.019 0.336 0.118 -0.166 1.000 -0.020 -0.638 -0.105 0.152 0.469 0.099 -0.027 0.164
Rim 0.674 -0.434 0.725 0.777 -0.020 1.000 0.150 0.827 -0.538 -0.271 0.617 0.778 0.191
Ro 0.309 -0.385 0.102 0.291 -0.638 0.150 1.000 0.321 -0.152 -0.835 -0.128 0.221 0.047
TDE 0.572 -0.365 0.663 0.595 -0.105 0.827 0.321 1.000 -0.345 -0.239 0.297 0.702 0.080
TIG -0.355 0.749 -0.305 -0.870 0.152 -0.538 -0.152 -0.345 1.000 0.246 -0.147 -0.273 -0.223
Tir -0.414 0.286 -0.184 -0.442 0.469 -0.271 -0.835 -0.239 0.246 1.000 -0.164 -0.225 -0.181
σп 0.677 0.159 0.725 0.394 0.099 0.617 -0.128 0.297 -0.147 -0.164 1.000 0.600 0.600
σz 0.852 -0.063 0.866 0.645 -0.027 0.778 0.221 0.702 -0.273 -0.225 0.600 1.000 0.479
Z 0.728 0.314 0.673 0.351 0.164 0.191 0.047 0.080 -0.223 -0.181 0.600 0.479 1.000
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ANNEX 3 
Tests and Result of the Panel Data Estimation  
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random Effects 
 
tinvp[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t] 
Estimated results: 
 Var sd = sqrt(Var) 
tinvp 14.75115        3.840722 
e 1.599784       1.2648257 
u 0       0 
chi2(1) =    26.25 Test:   Var(u) = 0 
Prob>chi2 =     0.0000 
                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hausman Specification Test of Exogeneity of Variables 
          
 Coefficients   
tinvp Fixed Effects Random Effects Difference 
σz .032211  .0060287          .0261824 
g .0998048      .1182218          -.018417 
z .1750776       .007552          .1675256 
Rim .4438041      .7166859         -.2728818 
RO .1639668      .2038777         -.0399109 
mue1 3.222702     -3.502229          6.724932 
mue2 -1.486485     -2.861004          1.374519 
chi2(  7) = (b-B)'[S^(-1)](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re) =   254.08 Test: H0:  difference 
in coefficients not 
systematic 
Prob>chi2 =     0.0000 
 
Chow Test of Homogeneity (Stability) of Coefficients 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression              Number of obs      =        57 
Group variable (i) : id                    Number of groups   =         4 
R-sq:   within  = 0.7789                 Obs per group: min =        12 
        between = 0.4043   avg =      14.2 
        overall = 0.4351   max =        15 
                                                                F(7,46) =     23.15 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8717                          Prob > F =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
tinvp |      Coef. Std. Err.  t  P>|t|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
σz  |    .032211    .008539  3.772  0.000  .0150228    .0493992 
g |   .0998048   .0522614  1.910  0.062  -.005392    .2050016 
z |   .1750776   .0308553  5.674  0.000  .1129692     .237186 
Rim |   .4438041   .1285111  3.453  0.001  .1851247    .7024835 
RO |   .1639668  .026031  6.299  0.000  .1115691    .2163645 
mue1 |   3.222702  1.00995  3.191  0.003  1.189779    5.255626 
mue2 |  -1.486485 .8701774  -1.708  0.094  -3.238061    .2650912 
_cons |  -18.34571 3.466455  -5.292  0.000  -25.32332    -11.3681 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
sigma_u |  6.4437169 
sigma_e |  1.2648257 
rho |  .96290035   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(3,46) =    34.31                Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Estimation of the Private Investment Ratio 
 
. reg tinvp  volz1 gr    tcer rim   ro mue1 mue2 id1 id2 id3 id4, nocons 
 
Source |       SS        df MS                   Number of obs =      57 
---------+------------------------------------------------------             F( 11,    46) =  435.11 
Model |  7656.82711     11 696.075192             Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Residual |  73.5900584     46 1.59978388             R-squared     =  0.7880 
---------+------------------------------------------------------             Adj R-squared =  0.7750 
Total |  7730.41717 57 135.621354             Root MSE      =  1.2648 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
tinvp |      Coef. Std. Err.  t P>|t|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
σz  |    .032211 .008539  3.772 0.000  .0150228    .0493992 
g |   .0998048 .0522614  1.910 0.062  -.005392    .2050016 
z |   .1750776 .0308553  5.674 0.000  .1129692     .237186 
Rim |   .4438041 .1285111  3.453 0.001  .1851248    .7024835 
RO |   .1639668 .026031  6.299 0.000  .1115691    .2163645 
mue1 |   3.222702 1.009949  3.191 0.003  1.189779    5.255625 
mue2 |  -1.486485 .8701773  -1.708 0.094  -3.238061    .2650913 
id1 |  -9.330281 2.424666  -3.848 0.000  -14.21088   -4.449681 
id2 |  -20.92721 3.446423  -6.072 0.000  -27.8645   -13.98992 
id3 |  -17.00647 3.1811  -5.346 0.000  -23.40969   -10.60325 
id4 |  -24.31577 4.738343  -5.132 0.000  -33.85356   -14.77798 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 4 
Tests and Result of the Single Equation Error Correction Model 
 
  
 
Value Sig. level I (n) Value Sig. level I (n)
GPIR -5.146b/ 1% I (2) -3.191a/ 5% I (1)
LGPIR -5.240b/ 1% I (2) -3.008c/ 1% I (1)
INFL -3.700a/ 5% I (1) -3.264a/ 5% I (0)
INFLSQ -3.789a/ 5% I (1) -4.477b/ 5% I (0)
REERU -4.013b/ 5% I (1) -3.394a/ 5% I (1)
REERUSQ -4.721b/ 5% I (1) -4.133b/ 5% I (1)
RLR -2.880c/ 1% I (1) -3.149a/ 5% I (0)
TOTU -4.839b/ 1% I (1) -3.677b/ 10% I (0)
TOTUSQ -7.279b/ 1% I (1) -6.627b/ 1% I (1)
CFE -2.854c/ 1% I (0) -3.127c/ 1% I (0)
GDP -3.019c/ 1% I (1) -3.071a/ 5% I (0)
LRGDP -2.809c/ 1% I (2) -4.529b/ 1% I (2)
LDEF -2.290c/ 5% I (1) -3.130a/ 5% I (1)
Note : ADF: Augmented Dickey-Fuller PP: Phillips-Perron
Sig.level : Significance level (in%) I (n): Integration order
a/ with intercept b/ with intercept and trend
c/ no intercept no trend
ADF (parametric test) PP (non-parametric test)
Unit Root Test D e p e n d e n t V a r ia b le :  D L G P IR 2
M e th o d : L e a s t S q u a re s
D a te : 0 6 /0 7 /0 5    T im e : 0 9 :1 7
S a m p le (a d ju s te d ):  1 9 9 0  2 0 0 3
In c lu d e d  o b s e rv a tio n s : 1 4  a fte r a d ju s t in g  e n d p o in ts
V a r ia b le C o e ff ic ie n t S td . E rro r t-S ta tis t ic P ro b .  
C 1 .5 2 6 6 5 9 2 .0 2 3 1 6 2 0 .7 5 4 5 9 1 0 .5 8 8 5
D IN F L 0 .0 3 8 3 1 8 0 .0 3 0 9 6 1 .2 3 7 6 9 1 0 .4 3 2 6
D R E E R U 0 .0 4 6 0 9 6 0 .0 2 5 3 9 1 .8 1 5 4 9 2 0 .3 2 0 5
D R L R 0 .0 3 7 3 4 5 0 .0 3 0 0 9 1 .2 4 1 1 1 4 0 .4 3 1 8
D T O T U -0 .0 0 2 8 5 2 0 .0 0 2 4 1 4 -1 .1 8 1 3 5 6 0 .4 4 7 2
D C F E 0 .0 7 4 7 6 8 0 .0 6 1 9 4 1 1 .2 0 7 0 9 1 0 .4 4 0 4
D L R G D P 2 8 .5 7 0 1 3 8 9 .4 5 7 0 3 8 0 .9 0 6 2 1 8 0 .5 3 1 3
D L D E F 2 .2 8 7 7 2 3 1 .1 5 3 0 4 4 1 .9 8 4 0 7 2 0 .2 9 7 2
D L G P IR (-1 ) -1 .2 7 9 1 9 2 0 .3 9 1 9 1 1 -3 .2 6 3 9 8 6 0 .1 8 9 3
C F E (-1 ) 0 .0 5 8 5 0 5 0 .0 5 2 8 2 4 1 .1 0 7 5 3 8 0 .4 6 7 5
T O T U (-1 ) -0 .0 0 2 8 4 3 0 .0 0 2 5 8 8 -1 .0 9 8 4 6 2 0 .4 7 0 2
D L R G D P (-1 ) 2 .3 8 0 8 5 1 8 .8 1 0 0 5 2 0 .2 7 0 2 4 3 0 .8 3 2
L D E F (-1 ) -0 .6 8 4 4 7 1 0 .9 7 7 1 7 2 -0 .7 0 0 4 6 1 0 .6 1 1
R -s q u a re d 0 .9 6 5 0 2     M e a n  d e p e n d e n t v a r -0 .0 0 6 4 9 3
A d ju s te d  R -s q u a re d 0 .5 4 5 2 5 7     S .D . d e p e n d e n t v a r 0 .0 9 6 6 8 5
S .E . o f  re g re s s io n 0 .0 6 5 1 9 9     A k a ik e  in fo  c r ite r io n -3 .4 0 4 6 5 3
S u m  s q u a re d  re s id 0 .0 0 4 2 5 1     S c h w a rz  c r ite r io n -2 .8 1 1 2 4 3
L o g  lik e lih o o d 3 6 .8 3 2 5 7     F -s ta t is t ic 2 .2 9 8 9 6 4
D u rb in -W a ts o n  s ta t 2 .1 4 1 9 0 9     P ro b (F -s ta t is t ic ) 0 .4 7 7 9 8 7
E s tim a te d  C o e ff ic e n ts A lp h a G a m m a
1 .2 7 9 1 9 2
C F E -0 .0 4 5 7 3 5 9
T O T U 0 .0 0 2 2 2 2 5
D L R G D P -1 .8 6 1 2 1 4 7 4
L D E F 0 .5 3 5 0 8 0 7 4
C 1 .1 9 3 4 5 5 7 1
S m a ll S a m p le  C o in te g ra t io n  T e s t
  
 
 
PP Test Statistic -3.870207     1%   Critical Value* -4.7315
    5%   Critical Value -3.7611
    10% Critical Value -3.3228
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 2    ( Newey-W est suggests: 2 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.017689
Residual variance with correction 0.013292
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RES1)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 06/07/05   Tim e: 09:42
Sample(adjusted): 1989 2003
Included observations: 15 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
RES1(-1) -1.160889 0.300998 -3.856797 0.0023
C -2.964984 0.776018 -3.820766 0.0024
@ TREND(1987) 0.015977 0.010037 1.591757 0.1374
R-squared 0.554346     Mean dependent var -0.009868
Adjusted R-squared 0.48007     S.D. dependent var 0.206221
S.E. of regression 0.148698     Akaike info criterion -0.796937
Sum squared resid 0.265335     Schwarz criterion -0.655326
Log likelihood 8.977024     F-statistic 7.463351
Durbin-W atson stat 1.860681     Prob(F-statistic) 0.007834
Phillips-Perron Cointegration Test on the Residual
B re u s c h -G o d f re y  S e r ia l C o r re la t io n  L M  T e s t :
F -s ta t is t ic 1 .1 4 1 0 6 7     P ro b a b il i ty 0 .5 5 1 9 7 8
O b s * R -s q u a re d 9 .7 3 4 4 8 2     P ro b a b il i ty 0 .0 0 7 6 9 5
T e s t  E q u a t io n :
D e p e n d e n t  V a r ia b le :  R E S ID
M e th o d :  L e a s t  S q u a re s
D a te :  0 6 /0 7 /0 5    T im e :  1 6 :2 4
V a r ia b le C o e f f ic ie n t S td .  E r ro r t -S ta t is t ic P ro b .   
C 0 .6 0 2 9 9 2 0 .6 2 4 4 5 6 0 .9 6 5 6 2 8 0 .5 1 1 1
D R L R 0 .0 0 1 5 5 6 0 .0 0 1 7 2 6 0 .9 0 1 2 2 9 0 .5 3 3
D R E E R U 0 .0 0 0 8 9 6 0 .0 0 9 0 4 0 .0 9 9 1 0 1 0 .9 3 7 1
D L D E F -0 .1 3 2 0 5 8 0 .2 1 2 9 8 1 -0 .6 2 0 0 4 6 0 .6 4 6 7
D L G P IR (-1 ) -0 .0 1 9 3 9 2 0 .1 5 4 1 5 8 -0 .1 2 5 7 9 2 0 .9 2 0 3
C F E (-1 ) 0 .0 0 2 4 5 6 0 .0 0 8 8 9 7 0 .2 7 6 0 6 8 0 .8 2 8 5
T O T U (-1 ) -0 .0 0 0 3 0 3 0 .0 0 0 6 0 5 -0 .5 0 1 1 3 3 0 .7 0 4 3
IN F L ( -2 ) 0 .0 0 0 2 9 1 0 .0 0 5 4 6 0 .0 5 3 3 6 6 0 .9 6 6 1
R E E R U (-1 ) 0 .0 0 3 5 8 4 0 .0 1 6 8 4 7 0 .2 1 2 7 1 9 0 .8 6 6 6
L D E F ( -2 ) -0 .3 1 1 9 5 3 0 .2 8 2 6 9 4 -1 .1 0 3 4 9 8 0 .4 6 8 7
R L R (-2 ) 0 .0 0 0 9 9 0 .0 0 3 2 0 1 0 .3 0 9 4 3 7 0 .8 0 9
R E S ID ( -1 ) -0 .8 5 3 4 1 4 1 .0 2 5 6 6 4 -0 .8 3 2 0 6 1 0 .5 5 8 2
R E S ID ( -2 ) -1 .5 7 6 0 7 4 1 .0 7 3 7 3 4 -1 .4 6 7 8 4 4 0 .3 8 0 7
R -s q u a re d 0 .6 9 5 3 2     M e a n  d e p e n d e n t  v a r -3 .1 2 E -1 6
A d ju s te d  R -s q u a re d -2 .9 6 0 8 3 8     S .D .  d e p e n d e n t  v a r 0 .0 1 1 5 7 6
S .E .  o f  re g re s s io n 0 .0 2 3 0 3 8     A k a ik e  in fo  c r ite r io n -5 .4 8 5 2 1 6
S u m  s q u a re d  re s id 0 .0 0 0 5 3 1     S c h w a rz  c r ite r io n -4 .8 9 1 8 0 6
L o g  l ik e l ih o o d 5 1 .3 9 6 5 1     F -s ta t is t ic 0 .1 9 0 1 7 8
D u rb in -W a ts o n  s ta t 1 .9 3 7 5 1 5     P ro b (F -s ta t is t ic ) 0 .9 5 9 2 9 6
  
 
 
R a m s e y  R E S E T  T e s t:
F -s ta tis tic 2 .2 7 3 0 9 9     P ro b a b ility 0 .4 2 4 6 2 2
L o g  lik e lih o o d  ra tio 2 3 .9 8 3 5 8     P ro b a b ility 0 .0 0 0 0 0 6
T e s t E q u a tio n :
D e p e n d e n t V a ria b le : D L G P IR 2
M e th o d : L e a s t S q u a re s
D a te : 0 6 /2 8 /0 5    T im e : 1 5 :5 6
S a m p le : 1 9 9 0  2 0 0 3
In c lu d e d  o b s e rva tio n s : 1 4
V a ria b le C o e ffic ie n t S td . E rro r t-S ta tis tic P ro b .  
C -0 .4 8 3 4 8 9 1 .6 4 4 3 1 6 -0 .2 9 4 0 3 6 0 .8 1 7 9
D R L R 0 .0 0 1 1 6 8 0 .0 0 3 6 7 4 0 .3 1 7 8 9 5 0 .8 0 4 1
D R E E R U 0 .0 1 8 9 4 9 0 .0 2 3 9 3 6 0 .7 9 1 6 8 4 0 .5 7 3 7
D L D E F 0 .3 6 8 1 0 7 0 .4 2 4 1 2 2 0 .8 6 7 9 2 5 0 .5 4 4 9
D L G P IR (-1 ) -0 .6 2 2 8 5 0 .6 7 3 2 3 -0 .9 2 5 1 6 6 0 .5 2 4 7
C F E (-1 ) -0 .0 0 5 4 4 0 .0 2 2 8 0 4 -0 .2 3 8 5 4 7 0 .8 5 0 9
T O T U (-1 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 8 2 0 .0 0 1 8 4 2 0 .0 9 8 9 9 8 0 .9 3 7 2
IN F L (-2 ) -0 .0 0 2 3 4 2 0 .0 1 4 3 6 -0 .1 6 3 0 6 9 0 .8 9 7 1
R E E R U (-1 ) 0 .0 0 7 4 9 5 0 .0 3 4 0 1 8 0 .2 2 0 3 0 9 0 .8 6 2
L D E F (-2 ) 0 .2 3 8 7 2 6 0 .5 1 0 7 1 4 0 .4 6 7 4 3 6 0 .7 2 1 6
R L R (-2 ) -0 .0 0 4 5 8 7 0 .0 0 8 1 4 1 -0 .5 6 3 4 9 4 0 .6 7 3 3
F IT T E D ^2 3 .3 7 8 2 2 4 1 .7 2 3 0 1 9 1 .9 6 0 6 4 2 0 .3 0 0 3
F IT T E D ^3 2 9 .7 7 4 0 6 1 9 .9 8 3 6 2 1 .4 8 9 9 2 3 0 .3 7 6 3
R -s q u a re d 0 .9 9 7 4 1 5     M e a n  d e p e n d e n t va r -0 .0 0 6 4 9 3
A d ju s te d  R -s q u a re d 0 .9 6 6 3 9 9     S .D . d e p e n d e n t va r 0 .0 9 6 6 8 5
S .E . o f re g re s s io n 0 .0 1 7 7 2 3     A k a ik e  in fo  c rite r io n -6 .0 0 9 8 3 5
S u m  s q u a re d  re s id 0 .0 0 0 3 1 4     S c h w a rz  c rite rio n -5 .4 1 6 4 2 5
L o g  lik e lih o o d 5 5 .0 6 8 8 5     F -s ta tis t ic 3 2 .1 5 7 9 3
D u rb in -W a ts o n  s ta t 3 .1 0 9 1 2 1     P ro b (F -s ta tis t ic ) 0 .1 3 7 0 3 4
ARCH Test:
F-statis tic 0.189601     P robability 0.67167
O bs*R-squared 0.220277     P robability 0.638829
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID^2
M ethod: Least Squares
Date: 06/29/05   T im e: 10:25
Sam ple(adjusted): 1991 2003
Included observations: 13 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coeffic ient S td. E rror t-S tatis tic Prob.  
C 0.000133 6.75E-05 1.974811 0.0739
RESID^2(-1) -0.130546 0.299807 -0.435432 0.6717
R-squared 0.016944     M ean dependent var 0.000116
Adjusted R-squared -0.072424     S .D . dependent var 0.000189
S .E . of regression 0.000196     Akaike info criterion -14.09977
Sum  squared resid 4.21E-07     Schwarz criterion -14.01285
Log like lihood 93.64848     F-statis tic 0.189601
Durbin-W atson stat 1.947076     P rob(F-statis tic) 0.67167
